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Articles
Morris L. Barer
Laura Wood*

Common Problems, Different
'Solutions': Learning from
International Approaches to
Improving Medical Services
Access for Underserved
Populations

Canada shares with most OECD countries the problems associated with inequitable geographic access to physician services, and improving the geographic
distribution of physicians is a policy preoccupation of all ministries of health in
Canada today. Recent court challenges by newly-entering physicians to physician supply controls in B.C. and New Brunswick have brought the issue into sharp
relief. The authors explore the degree to which the provinces have adopted
common approaches to addressing these problems, and whether Canadian
policy-makers have learned from international experience. The recent judgment
in the Waldman case in B.C. is analyzed in terms of likely implications for future
policies on the geographic distribution of physicians in Canada. The authors
conclude that the B.C. and New Brunswick cases may lead to broad changes in
health care policy direction by severely limiting the range of narrowly targeted
policy options available to ministries of health across Canada.
Le Canada partage, avec la plupart des pays de I'OCDE,un probleme d'acces
g6ographique inequitable aux services medicaux. Ameliorer la distribution
geographique des m6decins preoccupe aujourd'hui les divers Ministeres de
sant6 a travers le Canada. Les contestations judiciaires recentes mises en
oeuvre en Colombie-Britannique et au Nouveau-Brunswick, par des m6decinsentrants, mettenten reliefleproblemede distribution geographique des m6decins
au Canada. Les auteurs explorent combien les provinces ont eu recours a des
approches similaires afin de cernerce ,probl~me- et, deplus, si les responsables
canadiens ontappris des experiences internationales. LejugementWaldman en
Colombie-Britannique est ensuite examine en termes de ses implications sur la
future politique de distribution gographique des medecins au Canada. Les
auteurs concluent que I'exp6rience de la Colombie-Britannique et du NouveauBrunswick pourrait provoquer de grands changements en politique de sant6 en
limitant sdverement les options auxquelles les Ministeres de sante pourront avoir
* The authors are from the Centre for Health Services and Policy Research, the University
of British Columbia. We are grateful to Robin Hanvelt and David Schneider for useful insights
on the recent B.C. policy, to our many provincial and territorial correspondents for providing
the detail on the initiatives in each jurisdiction, to Alan Maynard, David Kindig and Jeff
Richardson for helping us understand recent approaches in the U.K., the U.S. and Australia
respectively, and to two anonymous referees of an earlier version of the paper, for suggestions
that meant a lot more work,but a much better paper. The surveys of provincial and international
policies were undertaken between the fall of 1996 and the spring of 1997; the policy
descriptions reflect those then in place. Any errors of omission or commission, are ours.
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recours afin d'adresser le problome de distribution des effectifs modicaux au
Canada.

Introduction
Canada shares with most OECD countries the problems associated with
inequitable geographic access to physician services. Wide variation in the
geographic supply of physicians is a problem with a long history and a
broad international sweep. It is thus a common feature across a rich and
varied mix of organizational and financing arrangements found in modem health care systems,' and has persisted despite an equally rich and
creative mix of attempts at remediation. In some countries considerable
geographic variation persists, despite decades of waiting for the markets
to solve the problem. In others, regulatory or financial initiatives intended
to improve these situations have had little effect. As a leading example of
this intra-country variation, the population per physician in the United
and
States varied in 1991 from about 660-725 in states such as Alaska
2
Idaho, to 265-280 in Maryland, Massachusetts, and New York.
Many OECD countries see this wide regional variation in physician
supply as a significant policy problem.3 Ironically, the problem co-exists
with a problem of aggregate oversupply in most of these countries: there
is widespread agreement that there are more than enough physicians to
meet the medical care needs of the populations, but some sub-populations
(particularly urban) are often considerably oversupplied with physicians 4 while others (particularly rural) continue to face access problems.
A few countries, such as Belgium, Switzerland, and Israel, do not seem
to have serious geographic distribution problems, but they are both
1. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, The Reform of Health Care
Systems: A Review of Seventeen OECD Countries (Paris: OECD, 1994).
2. Personal communication, Bradley Gray, University of Wisconsin - Madison, January
1997.
3. See, for example, A. Ritsatakis, "Problems Related to Future Medical Demography in the
European Community" in H. Viefhues, ed., Medical Manpower in the European Community
(New York: Springer-Verlag, 1988) at 205; A. Kalandidi & A. Ritsatakis, "Greece" in ibid. at
125; L. Malcolm, "The Development of Medical Workforce Policies in New Zealand" in
M.Barer & G. Stoddart, Toward IntegratedMedicalResource PoliciesforCanada:Appendix
1,HPRU Paper 91:7D (Vancouver: Centre for Health Services and Policy Research, University
of British Columbia, 1991).
4. "Oversupply" means that there are more physicians than is necessary to meet those clinical
needs that can most efficiently be met using individuals with extensive medical training. See,
e.g., M. Barer & G. Stoddart, Toward Integrated Medical Resource Policies for Canada
Background Document, HPRU Paper 91:6D (Vancouver: Centre for Health Services and
Policy Research, University of British Columbia, 1991). The effects of such oversupply can
include such empirical phenomena as use of services increasing far more rapidly than
population growth and aging would suggest might be appropriate; wide variations across small
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geographically much smaller than Canada, and preoccupied with the
policy implications of serious physician oversupply.
Differential access to physician services is commonly perceived as
contributing to deficiencies in the provision of medically necessary
services, and thus to geographic variations in population health status.
The relative contribution of medical care to population health within
developed countries is a matter of considerable debate. Evidence linking
access to physician services with the overall health status of a population
tends to be derived from studies of disadvantaged groups whose access
to medically necessary services is relatively poor, in part as a result of
geographic distribution, and in part because of other characteristics of
those groups (e.g., race, ethnicity, socio-economic status).5 The relationship between the availability of physician services and population health
status within a wide observable range of physician supply is not transparent, and so policies governing geographic distribution of physician
services may not necessarily, or only, be spawned by concerns about the
health of the populations served.
Consensus would clearly exist in certain situations that a region is
underserved in terms of relatively expeditious access to certain types of
clinical care. But how often these situations of restricted access result in
documented deleterious health effects is not clear. What does seem
indisputable is that the residents of such regions are often seriously
inconvenienced, and often have to incur considerable personal costs, to
obtain care that urban residents simply take for granted. This should not,
however, be taken as prima facie evidence that all, or most, claims
regarding relative undersupply of physicians in non-urban regions of
Canada would stand up to more detailed scrutiny. "Undersupply" seems
regions in the provision of particular services; widespread increases in the number of different
physicians seen by the average patient, no inverse correlation between availability and prices,
and so on. Whereas in other economic arenas, excess capacity would be expected to have a
dampening effect on prices and on incomes, this is generally not the case in health care, where
imprecise relationships between clinical problems, therapeutic decisions, and health effects
leave wide bands of discretion to clinicians. Thus there may be an almost infinite amount of
clinical care that would be of some (small) benefit to some (small) number of patients, so that
despite rapid increases in physician supply per capita, physicians can be kept busy and, in most
cases, still be "doing no harm." From a social policy perspective, however, committing scarce
public resources to such activity comes with a high "opportunity cost" - there are other
activities that would yield greater public benefit, and even greater health benefits, than
continuing to commit resources to the training and support of additional physicians. On the
topic of other determinants of health, see, e.g. R.G. Evans, M.L. Barer & T.R. Marmor, eds.,
Why are Some People Healthy and Others Not? The Determinants of Health of Populations
(New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1994).
5. N.P. Roos et al., Needs-Based PlanningforManitoba'sGeneralistPhysicians(Winnipeg:
Manitoba Centre for Health Policy and Evaluation, 1996); Evans, Barer & Marmor, supra
note4.
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often to be used in a 'relative,' rather than 'absolute' sense - regions with
far fewer physicians per capita than large urban centres are "undersupplied"
- irrespective of whether there is any evidence suggesting health deficits
attributable to such "undersupply," and whether other care-givers can
provide at least some of the necessary care.6 Whatever the rationales,
improving the geographic distribution of physicians is a policy preoccupation of all provincial and territorial departments of health in the country
today.
All this leads to two questions. First, have governments adopted
common approaches to addressing the 'problem'? Secondly, has the fact
that Canadian policy-makers are not alone in having to address both real
and perceived problems with geographic 'maldistribution' led them to
learn from international experience and evidence? It is these questions
that occupy us in this paper. We begin with a short summary of the policy
initiatives that one finds across Canada today. We then contrast the
domestic experience with a limited selection of some of the more relevant
international experiences. We conclude the paper with a brief discussion
of the current legal initiatives related to recent Canadian approaches,
again tying these to international experience.

I. Canadian 'Solutions'- a briefoverview
In every province and territory in the country today, one finds a witch's
brew of strategies to entice physicians to rural and remote areas and retain
them there. Policy approaches to improving the geographic distribution
of physicians may be distinguished according to whether they are
primarily regulatory/administrative, educational, financial, or laissezfaire strategies, although these often overlap in practice. For example,
many financial incentives are rooted in enabling legislation, and there are
a variety of financial incentives tied in one way or another to physician
training. A billing numbers policy which restricts the issuance of 'rights'
to bill a provincial medical plan for services rendered could be viewed as
a financial disincentive program in which the disincentive was a 0% fee
proration. Nevertheless, most policies seem to fit relatively comfortably
within one of the above categories.
6. Of course for many specialties and sub-specialties there are good and logical reasons for
urban supply to be considerably higher than that in other regions. For example, the population
required to keep a thoracic or cardiac surgeon fully occupied can easily number in the hundred
thousands-in such situations it makes little sense to talk about "equal" access. But similar
arguments do not ring true for general/family practice in particular, and some primary care
specialties. Here the reverse is often argued-that with the much easier access to specialist
services, the urban requirement for primary care practitioners could be, if anything, somewhat
less than the non-urban requirements.
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By "regulatory/administrative" approaches we mean any public policies with a primary intent of influencing location decisions. These may
be 'codified' in provincial or federal statutes, or take the form of policies
enacted by bodies who have been given self-regulatory powers through
acts or regulations, or may be applied through administrative rules. The
latter may include restrictions on the issuance of 'billing numbers,'
without which physicians cannot receive reimbursement from the provincial medical insurance plan, and controls on the recruitment, training
and licensing options of 'foreign medical graduates' (physicians who
received their medical training outside Canada). "Financial" approaches
include different methods of paying providers, as well as incentives
within a payment system. The latter are perhaps the most familiar and
long-standing in Canada, and include northem/isolation allowances or
income floors, loan forgiveness, assistance with practice expenses,
differential fees (e.g., discounted fees for practitioners locating in areas
designated as "amply- or over-supplied"), and the like. Among "educational" initiatives we include a wide range of policies, ranging from high
school science enrichment to curricular and clinical exposures provided
during medical and post-graduate training.
By "laissez-faire" we mean the approach of "letting 'the market' take
care of it." This approach is commonly based on the view that as urban
centres become more crowded, there will be a spill-over or 'trickle-down'
effect which will result in more physicians setting up practice in rural
areas. It would also include efforts by communities, regions, or even
departments of health, to 'advertise' opportunities in, and attractions of,
particular locations in need of physicians. Thus we consider initiatives
such as "recruitment fairs" or "recruitment tours," intended to heighten
awareness among practising and soon-to-be-practising physicians of
opportunities in underserved areas, as components of a "laissez-faire"
approach; these are the sorts of promotional activities one would expect
to find if the matter of distribution is left to 'the market.'
In the table below, we list the main policy approaches taken by
provincial and territorial governments during the past twenty-odd years,
as revealed through our review of policy documents, and responses to
requests (in late 1996 and early 1997) for information from each of the
provinces and territories .7If a policy was implemented for a time and then

7. Requests for information were sent to each province's or territory's health care representative on the federal/provincial/territorial Advisory Committee on Health Human Resources.
We requested information that would describe any current policies that had as a key objective
the geographic redistribution of physicians in the province or territory. We also requested
information on the history of geographic distribution policies in each jurisdiction. Information
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rescinded, it is still identified with a "yes." Thus, any attempts to manage
physician geographic distribution by the methods listed below have been
included, in order to illustrate both the intractability of the problem, and
the wide and imaginative range of potential solutions that have been
applied over the past few decades. It is important to note that the table
provides a conservative picture of the policy mix, because provincial
respondents tended to be somewhat more thorough in providing a picture
of current and recent policies than they were in providing us with a
complete historical picture. In other words, the table may reflect a certain
amount of under-reporting of past policies no longer in effect.
Table I-Provincial/Territorial Policy Approaches
Policy Approaches

B.C. Alta. Sask. Man. Ont. Que. N.S. N.B. P.E.I. Nfld. Yuk. N.W.T.

Regulatory/
Administrative
Billing numbers

V

X

Foreign medical graduates

/

X

/

/

/

/

X

/

/

/

X

X

X

X

X

X

/

X

X

Funding/Payment
Isolation payments

V

Subsidized income

/

X

/

V

/

X

X

X

/

X

X

X

X

/

/

/

/

/

X

V

/

X

Differential fees

/

X

X

X

/

/

X

/

/

/

/

X

Undergraduate/postgraduate student loans
with return of service

X

V

V/

/

/

/

X

X

X

/

X

V

Undergraduate/ postgraduate student loans
without return of service

X

X

X

V

X

/

X

X

X

X

X

X

Locum/financial support
for additional training,
cme*, vacation relief, etc.

/

/

/

/

/

*

/

/

V'

X

X

Rural training/exposure

/

/

X

/

V

.

X

X

X

/

X

X

Special recruitment
policies

V

X

X

X

X

/

X

X

X

/

X

X

/

X

X

*/

X

X

X

X

X

X

/

Educational

Market-based Initiatives
Recruitment fairs/tours
X
* continuing medical education

was synthesized from information provided directly by those correspondents or others to
whom we were referred,and government and published documents. A complete list of relevant
references, and key contacts, is available from the authors.
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With the exception of Prince Edward Island and the Yukon territory,
provinces and territories have tried and continue to employ combinations
of policy approaches that encompass more than one of the generic policy
categories. One might infer from the number and range of policy
approaches that none has been successful in redressing geographical
imbalances, and this is generally supported by the very limited evaluative
evidence available from the Canadian experience. While evaluations of
the policy approaches have not been undertaken routinely, some evidence
has emerged from Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec. For example, an
evaluation of the Rural Physician Action Plan in Alberta (which provided
for rural training, extended skills training, continuing medical education
support, student loans with return of service requirements, a physician
recruitment fair, and locum support) reported data indicating that rural
areas had become less successful at recruiting and/or retaining physicians
after the Plan was implemented.8 Of course there have been extenuating
circumstances in the wider health care policy arena in Alberta,9 which
bring to light the difficulty of policy evaluation in a constantly changing
external environment.
The Ontario Underserviced Areas Program has been reviewed several
times, and opinions differ as to how successful it has been in redressing
geographical inequities. An analysis performed in 1990 concluded that
the program had not resulted in any significant redistribution," while a
later review called it "a qualified success."" A key methodological
difficulty with evaluating the effectiveness of any of these programs is
that it is impossible to ascertain what number of relocations might have
taken place in the absence of the programs, and 'control' regions are
either not available or are not sufficiently comparable in other key
respects.
While Qudbec has employed a wide range of initiatives to improve its
geographic distribution of physicians, a long-standing differential fees
program has been at the heart of its approach. A recently published

8. C.A. MacDonald and Associates, Evaluationof the Rural PhysicianAction Plan(Prepared
for Alberta Health, 1996) [unpublished].
9. Particularly important among these "extenuating circumstances" are the recent sharp
reductions in the funds available under Alberta's global expenditure cap for medical services;
(see M.L. Barer, C. Sanmartin, and J. Lomas), Physician ExpenditureControl in Canada:Reminding our Psand Qs, HPRU Paper 95:7D (Vancouver: Centre for Health Services and Policy
Research, University of British Columbia, 1995).
10. M. Anderson & M.W. Rosenberg, "Ontario's Underserviced Area Program Revisited:
An Indirect Analysis" (1990) 30 Soc. Sci. Med. 35.
11. Dreezer and Dreezer, Inc., "Review of the Underserviced Area Program for the Health
Human Resources Planning Group, Ministry of Health" (draft report, February 1992)
[unpublished].
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evaluation suggests that the Qu6bec policies have had a considerable
effect on the distribution of general practitioners in the province. 2
Indeed, the proportion of new general practitioners who decided to set up
practice in a remote or isolated region increased from 11.4% in 1981 to
23.8% in 1988. However,the policies have had no detectable effect on the
location decisions (or relative supply) of specialists in the province,
despite a rich mix of incentives directed towards specialities like internal
medicine, obstetrics, general surgery, and paediatrics, which made it
particularly advantageous for specialists to provide services on contract
to hospitals in isolated and remote areas.
There have not been any formal evaluations of student loan programs
which rely upon return-of-service guarantees to secure service provision
for underserviced areas. Evidence from Alberta indicated that the student
loan remission program had not been especially successful, 3 while
outcomes appear not to have been tracked in Saskatchewan, Ontario, or
Newfoundland. Manitoba reports that, as of June 1996, about 21% of
those receiving forgivable loans with obligatory return-of-service had
repaid their loans with interest, and 46% had completed part or all of their
return-of-service. In Qu6bec it is known that although there are 90
bursaries with return-of-service obligations available each year, only 50
candidates apply annually, and of those who do begin their return-ofservice, about 50% repay the remainder of the loan after one year of
service.
Canada's limited experience with regulatory/administrative restrictions on rights to payment (billing numbers) policies has been insufficient
to provide any detailed opportunity for evaluation. The first experience,
in British Columbia in the mid- 1980s, has never been formally evaluated
(or, if such evaluation exists, it has never been published). However,
some applications for billing numbers were denied during this period, and
preliminary data examined at the time suggested some reduction in the
issuance of numbers as a result of the policy. However, many of these
denied applications showed up as unrestricted locum tenens, and so the
overall effects are likely never to be known. 4
More recently, New Brunswick has instituted a similar policy, which
has been in place since 1992. Regional hospital corporations are responsible for granting privileges to physicians. Under the current policy, such
12. D. Bolduc, B. Fortin & M. Fournier, "The Effect of Incentive Policies on the Practice
Location of Doctors: A Multinomial Probit Analysis" (1996) 14 J. Lab. Econ. 703.
13. MacDonald and Associates, supra note 8.
14. For a description of the history of the policy, and a very limited analysis of its effects, see
M. Barer, "Regulating Physician Supply: The Evolution of British Columbia's Bill 41"
(1988)13 J. Health Pol. Policy L. 1.
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privileges are granted (in the form of a list of procedures that the particular
physician in question is authorized to perform in the hospital in question) 5 according to whether the region in question requires additional
physicians of any given specialty in order to meet specialty- and regionspecific targets established through an extensive planning process involving the province's Physician Resources Advisory Committee. A
physician without privileges could, in theory, practice in the region, but
would not have access to the hospital, and would not be issued a billing
number. In practice, it seems unlikely that a physician would choose to
establish a practice without a billing number.
This policy has been subject to limited review, which seems to indicate
that the Plan during its first three years had achieved some success in
improving the geographic distribution of physicians in that province. 6
One of the key problems with such approaches is that, if applied in a single
province, physicians may choose to migrate to other provinces rather than
to set up rural/remote area practices.
In terms of the taxonomy described above, it would seem that financially oriented schemes predominate in past and present efforts to remedy
geographic distribution problems in Canada. This is so despite rather
widespread evidence that financial considerations tend to be well down
the list of preoccupations of those making practice location decisions."
Qu6bec appears to be the exception, where the differential fees approach
seems to have had some effect on redistribution. It may be that language
plays some role in limiting the (perceived) mobility of some segment of
the Qu6bec physician population, but this is mere speculation. Some
15. New Brunswick, "Regional Hospital Corporation Interim By-Laws" (mimeograph, n.d.
1992) [unpublished].
16. See J. Reamy, Managing Physician Resources: The Effectiveness of the New Brunswick
Plan (Report for New Brunswick Department of Health and Community Services, 1995)
[unpublished]; and J. Reamy, "Physician Resource Management in New Brunswick: The First
Three Years" (Paper presented at International Health Economics Association Inaugural
Conference, Vancouver, May 1996).
17. See, for example, B. Ferrier et al., The Employed Spouse: Impact on Physicians' Career
and Family Decisions,Working Paper 96-21 (Hamilton, Ont.: McMaster University Centre for
Health Economics and Policy Analysis, 1996); Canadian Medical Association, Report of the
Advisory Panel on the Provision of Medical Services in Underserviced Regions (Ottawa:
CMA, 1992); A. Kazanjian et al., Study of Rural Physician Supply: Practice Location
Decisionsand Problemsin Retention, HPRU 91:2 (Vancouver: Centre for Health Services and
Policy Research 1991); D.S. Wright, FactorsInfluencing the Location of PracticeofResidents
and Interns in British Columbia:Implicationsfor Policy Making (M.Sc. Thesis, Department
of Health Care and Epidemiology, University of British Columbia, 1985). This literature
makes clear the paramount importance of spousal and other family considerations, and of work
environment issues such as practice facilities, on-call and holiday relief, and opportunities for
continuing education; and the relatively minor importance given to financial considerations
and incentives.
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financial approaches operate as practice supports, in that they subsidize
continuing education, additional skills training, and locum provision.
Practice supports have been identified by some rural practitioners as
important to retention considerations (although less important for
recruitment).
Recruitment has also been addressed through a growing number of
educational initiatives. In B.C., the U.B.C. Department of Family Practice now actively seeks graduates who were raised in non-urban environments, and most Canadian medical schools now offer rural exposures as
an element of undergraduate and/or post-graduate training. Regulatory/
administrative methods have been of two general types- 'billing numbers' restrictions (the mid-I 980s B.C. experience and the current New
Brunswick plan being the most obvious examples), and a variety of
regulatory or administrative restrictions on the geographic mobility of
foreign medical graduates who enter Canada to take up specific rural or
remote practices. Finally, the information in Table I would suggest that,
in general, Canadian policy-makers have tended not to rely on the
(misguided) hope that simply training more physicians would result in an
adequate geographic distribution-each province has developed a variety of purposive measures in an attempt to counteract the gravitational
pull of large urban centres.
In short, the largely financially-based approaches, tied to fee-forservice reimbursement (either in the form of differential fees as in Qudbec
or B.C., or in the form of supplementary incentive packages), continue to
dominate the geographic distribution policy landscape in Canada, despite
two countervailing facts: (a) the research on determinants of locational
decision-making seems to suggest that other factors outweigh financial
considerations; 8 and (b) with the possible exception of Qudbec, the
evaluative evidence suggests that the financial approaches to date have
not been particularly effective. Is Canada alone in taking this approach?
Does international experience offer any further insight? Or, put differently, is there experience outside Canada's borders that would support
Canadian policy-makers' continued preoccupation with fee-based financial incentives?
II. A (Selective) InternationalPerspective
The two countries to which Canada is most frequently compared in
matters of health care policy are the United Kingdom and the United
States. Interestingly, these two countries have taken quite different
18.

See supra note 17.
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approaches to solving problems quite similar to those in Canada, with
quite different measures of success. The U.K. versus U.S. comparison is,
we believe, particularly illuminating for those addressing the problem in
the Canadian context.
The United Kingdom has, since the inception of its National Health
Service (NHS), employed regulatory/administrative approaches to geographic distribution, and has enjoyed evident success with those methods. The U.K. has what is referred to as a "negative direction" or negative
control regulatory policy affecting the distribution of general practitioners (GPs). A central "Medical Practices Committee" (MPC) must
approve all GP applications for practice. This Committee has the power
to refuse an application if it considers that the number practising in an area
is adequate. Adequacy is determined by the size of patient rosters.
"Designated" areas are those with average GP list sizes 9 of 2500 patients
and above, "open" areas have average list sizes of 2101-2499, "intermediate" areas have average lists of 1701-2100 patients, and "restricted"
areas are those with average lists of 1700 or fewer patients per GP.
Applications to practice in designated and open areas are usually granted
without question, while those for intermediate and restricted areas are
considered on the basis of detailed advice from the appropriate local
family practice committee and may be refused .20 Importantly, the MPC
"has absolute discretion in approving or denying any GP location
requests."'" The negative direction policy was evaluated in the mid1970s, and was found to have some perverse effects. One of the most
important is that the areas with the fewest physicians were less likely to
be "designated" because of their sparse populations. More recently, its
effects have been dampened by the rather liberal list size 'cut points.' For
example, there are few "designated" areas remaining in the U.K., and in
practice many applications to "intermediate" areas are granted. Nevertheless, overall the policy is widely seen as having provided a reasonably
equitable distribution of GP services.22
The U.K. has also utilized financial incentives. An initial practice
allowance is payable for those setting up practices in designated areas.
Those who remain in practice in designated areas for a period of time also
receive additional remuneration in the form of a designated area allow19. "List size" refers to the number of patients registered with a physician.
20. R. Haynes, The Geographyof Health Services in Britain (London: Croom Helm, 1987).
21. D. Taylor, The NaturalLife ofPolicyIndices: GeographicalProblem Areas in the US and
UK (University of Manchester, 1996) [unpublished manuscript].
22. A. Maynard & A. Walker, "The Physician Workforce in the U.K.: Issues, Prospects and
Policies" (Background paper prepared for Inaugural Trilateral Conference on Physician
Workforce: Washington, D.C., 1-3 November 1996).
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ance. The most important incentive was found to be the designated area
allowance, though most practitioners regarded it as far too low to affect
practice decisions. In addition, the allowances could be counter-productive in that they give established physicians in designated areas an
incentive to discourage or refuse newcomers, since the allowance is lost
once list sizes drop below the margin, and the MPC membership is
dominated by GPs. 23

With the 1990 NHS GP contract, an additional set of incentives was
added. These use an index called the "UPA 8" (which is a weighted
average of factors such as percentage of elderly living alone, single parent
families, unemployed, unskilled workers) to designate the status of
geographically small areas. For areas that are deemed "deprived," a
"deprivation payment" is "attached" to all area residents. GPs who have
such patients on their lists receive a capitation (per enrolled patient)
supplement, as an incentive to serve patients from areas with these
characteristics. The annual capitation supplements ranged in 1995/96
from approximately $15 to $25 per designated patient .24 Since these areas
tend to be those less coveted by physicians looking to locate practices, this
has the effect of creating an incentive to set up practice in relatively less
well-served areas.
In addition, a variety of other initiatives are mentioned in the literature,
most often with little explanatory detail. A selective list would include an
"Inducement Scheme" that provides physicians with "a family-sized
house and a surgery for rent ... [plus] 80% of the current agreed average
general practitioner earnings ... [and] locums for annual and study leave

... paid for by the health authority;" 25 an "Associate Scheme" that
provides "salary and expenses, at approximately senior registrar level, for
a doctor to work on a shared basis between two or three isolated practices
... at least ten miles apart;" 26 compensation to primary care physicians
for "increased time spent travelling when caring for patients in sparsely
populated areas;"27 the "Primary Care Initiative Program" that provides
selected assistance to Liverpool practices that require it; and the "London
Initiative Zone" that provides a variety of allowances intended to encour-

23. Haynes, supra note 20.
24. Taylor, supra note 21.
25. J. Macleod, "Recruitment to rural practice" (1995) 71(Sept.) Occ. Papers Royal C. Gen.
Practitioners 43.
26. Ibid.
27. United States, House of Representatives, Primary CarePhysicians:Managing Supply in
Canada, Germany,Sweden, and the United Kingdom: Report to the Chairman,Committee on
Government Operations(Washington: General Accounting Office, 1994).
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age new practice arrangements within the "LIZ."28 These strategies seem
to be secondary to the major U.K. programs.
One might ask why these administrative and financial mechanisms are
necessary, if GPs are paid on a capitation basis to start with. "Under a
strict capitation system competition for patients (or their associated
capitation fees) would produce strong financial incentives to locate in
areas of under supply ... , but a large proportion of an average GP's

income comes from non-capitation sources."2 9 Indeed, while the largely
capitation-based method of funding primary care is seen by local students
of the U.K. policies as having been quite an effective approach to
ensuring reasonable access to primary care services," its effects on
geographic distribution have undoubtedly been vitiated somewhat by the
array of 'envelopes' through which general practitioners can receive
income.3" On balance, however, the combination of central decisionmaking through the Medical Practices Committee and funding tied
significantly to the number of patients on a GP's practice list, has left the
U.K. in a situation where geographic maldistribution of primary care
physicians is not currently seen as a problem (although pockets of
underservicing do remain).
As for specialist services, most specialists are (at least in part) salaried
employees of Hospital Trusts. Funds for specialist services are allocated
to regions, and the regional authorities make funds available to hospital
trusts on the basis of populations served. Trusts now have some independent latitude in setting "terms and conditions of employment" for
specialists, which may facilitate recruitment of specialists to some
shortage areas.32 The regional funding formulae, and the development of
independent Hospital Trusts has apparently improved the distribution of
specialist services, because it has been possible to steer specialists to the
populations in need of those services. Like the capitation-based funding
for GP services, the approach of having funding follow populations
seems to have reduced problems of geographic maldistribution.
Educational policy approaches do not appear to have played a major
role in the U.K.'s methods for managing the distribution of physician
28. Review Body on Doctors' and Dentists' Remuneration, Twenty-Fifth Report 1996
(London: HMSO, 1996).
29. S. Birch & A. Maynard,"Medical human resources policy in the UK" Appendix H in M.L.
Barer & G.L. Stoddart, Toward IntegratedMedical Resource Policiesfor Canada:Appendices, HPRU Paper 91:7D (Vancouver: Centre for Health Services and Policy Research,
University of British Columbia, 1991).
30. Maynard & Walker, supra note 22.
31. Review Body on Doctors' and Dentists' Remuneration, supra note 28, Appendix A at
65-69.
32. Maynard & Walker, supra note 22.
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services, and there has certainly been limited, if any, reliance on 'market
forces.' It could be argued that the market may play a greater role in the
distribution of specialists than of GPs, thanks to the persistence of a
parallel private health care system from which some specialists receive
as much as 40% of their incomes .33 Areas with higher concentrations of
patients with private health insurance would be attractive to such specialists. Since no effort has been taken to manage that aspect of the system,
the existence of an alternative source of income in one area would likely
be a considerable incentive to a specialist physician making location
decisions.
The use of regulatory/administrative approaches in the U.K. and the
consequent resolution of many geographic distribution problems is in
direct contrast to the general reliance on "laissez-faire" approaches in the
U.S. All observers of the U.S. scene agree that there are radical problems
with the geographic distribution of physicians, despite continuing increases in supply over the last 25 years. For example, about "20 percent
of the U.S. population lives in rural areas while only 9 percent of the
nation's physicians practice in rural communities."34 The difficulty has
been exacerbated by the increasing preference of recently-trained physicians to choose non-primary care specialties and sub-specialties. It is
well-known that primary care practitioners are much more likely than are
secondary and particularly tertiary specialists to end up in non-urban
practices. Overall, the U.S. medical associations, medical schools and
governments at the state and federal level have relied upon a noninterventionist approach (faith in 'trickle-down'), supplemented by relatively small-scale and rather ad hoc programs which use educational and
financial levers, to address distributional issues. Indeed, the U.S. approach has been recently described by an American observer as
33. While the private sector in the U.K. overall represents less than 5% of total expenditures
(Maynard & Walker, ibid.), private sector revenues are very unevenly distributed. Arrangements for specialist commitments to the NHS are quite loose (see, e.g., J.Yates, PrivateEye,
HeartandHip: SurgicalConsultants,the NationalHealth Service andPrivateMedicine (New
York: Churchill Livingstone, 1995); and D. Light,Betrayalby the Surgeons (1996) 347 Lancet
812. For example, in return for relinquishing I/ 1Iof NHS salary, a specialist can in actual fact
spend an unregulated amount of time in private practice. Maynard and Walker suggest that
specialists "who progress steadily through the grades of the hospital service will reach a salary
of approximately £40,000 in their late thirties and a salary of £52,500 as a consultant in their
forties ...[and] [p]rivate practice, available mainly to surgical specialties and anaesthetics,
might add an average of £30,000...."
34. T. Konrad, "The Problem of Shortages of Physicians and Other Health Professionals in
Rural Areas: Empirical Evidence and Policy Recommendations" (Report prepared for the
Council on Graduate Medical Education (COGME) Workgroup on Health Professions
Workforce Policy and Geographic Distribution) (Chapel Hill: North Carolina Rural Health
Research Program, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1996).
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"apiecemeal effort to respond to geographical problem areas ...and not
a coherent strategy designed to rationalize the allocation of health
resources to improve access.

35

If there is a "general approach" in the U.S., it would appear to be to use
some sort of index or other method to identify "underserved" or "shortage" areas in absolute terms, and then to make federal or state funds
available to those areas, or to individuals prepared to set up practices in
those areas. The National Health Service Corps (NHSC) is a financial
incentive program rooted in federal legislation, and designed to recruit
(and retain) primary care physicians to (and in) rural and underserved
areas, including those in metropolitan centres. Developed in 1972, and
operating through a combination of incentives and coercion (scholarships and loans, with an obligation of "return-in-service"), it has trained
over 20,000 health professionals, the majority of whom have been
physicians. A method was developed to identify Health Professional
Shortage Areas (HPSA), and NHSC funds are allocated only to such
areas. This method involves combining information on the population:
physician ratio, and "locally provided information on health need[s] and
health facilities. 3 6 However, the population: physician ratio appears to
be the most important factor, and the 'cutoff' ratio appears to be set not
on the basis of any research, but rather so as to ensure that about onequarter of all U.S. counties are eligible for NHSC funds. Thus, it has been
a moving target over the life of the program. Since the inception of the
NHSC, however, a variety of other financial assistance programs have
also adopted the HPSA as the basis on which they allocate funds.3"
Another financial incentive program has its roots in the Health
MaintenanceOrganizationAct ofl973.38 This Act uses a different index,
the "Index of Medical Underservice" (based on factors identified by an
expert physician panel as being indicators of underservicing) to identify
"Medically Underserviced Areas" (MUA).9 The intent of this initiative
was to make funds available to underserviced areas in order to encourage
the development of HMOs in those areas.
Small areas (usually counties) must apply to the federal government
for designation either as an MUA or an HPSA, in order to be eligible for
funds that can be used for programs intended to improve recruitment or

35. Taylor, supra note 21.
36. Ibid.
37. United States, Health CareShortageAreas:DesignationsNot a Useful Toolfor Directing
Resources to the Underserved(Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office 1995).
38. Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 300).
39. Taylor, supra note 21.

336

The Dalhousie Law Journal

retention of health care professionals. Under the HPSA program, counties must re-apply every three years, or they are dropped from the list, and
new shortage areas are only added if they actually apply for designation.
As a result, one could have changes in the list of HPSAs without
accompanying changes in the actual relative supply of health care
professionals. Historically, there has been considerable variation in the
probability that a shortage area would actually go to the effort of applying,
depending largely on whether it perceived that funds would be forthcoming, and whether the host state was aggressive in assisting small areas.4 o
In 1994 the NHSC awarded 429 scholarships (189 for physicians) and
536 loan-repayment contracts (217 to physicians).
. Evaluation of the NHSC programs has tended to focus on the issue of
whether physicians who go through this program end up staying in
HPSAs beyond their term of "service repayment." A nine-year follow-up
study indicated that between 1984 and 1990, fewer NHSC physicians
than non-NHSC physicians remained in the practices in which they
worked in 1981, or more generally in practice in a rural county. Longterm (8-year) retention percentages for NHSC and non-NHSC physicians
were 12% versus 39%, with 29% versus 52% among non-NHSC physicians remaining in non-metropolitan practices.4 Problems with retention
and satisfaction have since been studied extensively. Factors associated
with dissatisfaction include the fact that two-thirds were matched to states
where they had not lived or trained, and the sense that the needs of spouses
and children and their personal life issues were not dealt with adequately.42 In addition, it appears that within HPSA-designated areas,
there are more and less desirable places to practice. The task of the NHSC
is to place practitioners into areas on the basis of relative need, whereas
those settling in HPSA areas on their own can choose their locations. As
a result, it is likely the case that the NHSC-placed individuals are, on
average, in subjectively less desirable areas than are the non-NHSC
physicians practising in HPSAs .43
A general evaluation of rural HPSA retention was carried out between
1990 and 1992. It found that about 20% of primary care physicians who
had located to underserviced areas during the period of study had gone

40. Konrad, supra note 34.
41. D.E. Pathman, T.R. Konrad, & T.C. Ricketts, "The Comparative Retention of National
Health Service Corps and Other Rural Physicians: Results of a Nine-year Follow-up Study"
(1992) 268 J. Am. Med. Assoc. 1552.
42. D.E. Pathman, T.R. Konrad, & T.C. Ricketts, "The National Health Service Corps
Experience for Rural Physicians in the Late 1980s" 1994 272 J. Am. Med. Assoc. 1341.
43. Personal communication with Fitzhugh Mullan (Contributing Editor, Health Affairs)
(November 1996).
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through the NHSC program. Approximately 60% of NHSC physicians
and 40% of non-NHSC physicians had left their rural practice setting
within four years of arrival. Seventy percent of NHSC physicians
intended to leave their assigned practice within 6 years. About 40% of
NHSC physicians, in contrast to about two-thirds of the non-NHSC
physicians in the same HPSAs, intended to stay for six years in rural
practice at the time they began their practices. About 40% of the NHSC
participants in HPSAs intended to move to urban areas within the first six
years, in marked contrast to less than 10% of the other rural (non-NHSC)
physicians surveyed. At least one-third of the NHSC physicians had only
a short-term interest in underserviced area practice."
"[Alabout one of every four new primary care physicians entering
HPSAs in the late 1980s was placed there under the NHSC scholarship
or loan repayment programs," but to argue that "this fact alone boldly
illustrates the impact of the program in quantitative terms,' 45 may
overstate the case. Indeed, we have no way of knowing whether those
same, or other, primary care physicians might have settled in HPSAs in
the absence of the NHSC. The evidence from the Pathman and Konrad
evaluations suggests that those who chose to settle in HPSAs through
their own volition were more committed to rural area practice and more
likely to stick with it, than were physicians attracted to such practices
through a financial incentive program. However, whether this reflects
problems with the program administration, lack of comparability because
of failure to adjust for sub-regions within HPSAs, or simply the fact that
what attracts physicians to rural areas are not, fundamentally, financial
considerations, is impossible to ascertain from the evidence reviewed
here.
Of course, the NHSC must be evaluated in the context of other
measures intended to encourage rural recruitment and retention. A recent
study noted that rural counties in sparsely settled states typically lost three
or more physicians for every four new ones they acquired, despite the fact
that many of these states have medical schools that encourage matriculation of students from rural backgrounds, place special emphasis on
primary care and rural practice, and have well-developed rural-oriented
graduate medical education programs.4 6

44. T.R. Konrad et al., The Rural HPSA PhysicianRetention Study, final report of Grant No.
RO I HS 06544-0 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Agency for Health
Care Policy and Research, 1993).
45. Konrad, supra note 34.
46. T. Konrad & H. Li,"Migrating Docs: Studying Physician Practice Location" (1995) 274
J. Am. Med. Assoc. 1914.
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Another financial mechanism in the U.S. has been the payment of
Medicare bonuses to physicians practising in underserved areas. Beginning in 1989, a 5% bonus payment was made available to rural HPSAs
with the most severe physician shortages. This was increased to 10% in
1991 and was extended to all rural and urban HPSA's .This policy was
enacted despite the fact that "relevant literature has indicated that
physician location and retention decisions are [only] somewhat influenced by financial factors...." The underlying premise was that "payment incentives appear to have greater potential for retainingphysicians
currently located in underserved areas than for attracting new physicians...." 47 It is also important to recall that these bonuses are available
only for services provided to the Medicare population in the United States
which is composed almost entirely of seniors.
In the U.S., educational policy approaches have been used at the state
level, with special emphasis on recruitment and rural training. Several
4
medical schools have reported good results with these programs. 1
Unfortunately, federal funding to medical schools appears to have been
designed rather perversely, again exposing the ad hoc nature of U.S.
physician resource policies. It is well known that general practitioners are
over twice as likely to settle in small isolated counties as their specialist
counterparts. Yet the amount of federal (particularly National Institute of
Health) funding a school receives is inversely related to its propensity to
graduate physicians who would likely locate in rural areas. Indeed,
Rosenblatt et al. noted four characteristics that are strongly associated
with the tendency to produce rural graduates: location of school in a rural
state, public ownership, emphasis on family physicians, and less NIH
49
funding ."
We are aware of only one recent study comparing leading national
policies in different countries. Taylor notes that "the National Health
Service Corps is one of the most highly visible and probably most
evaluated of the responses to geographical problem areas in the U.S. Yet

47. Physician Payment Review Commission, "Bonus Payments in Health Professional
Shortage Areas" in Annual Report to Congress 1994 (Washington: PPRC, 1994) 429
[emphasis added].
48. A. Roberts, L. Davis & J. Wells, "Where Physicians Practicing in Appalachia in 1978 to
1990 Were Trained and How They Were Distributed in Urban and Rural Appalachia" (1991)
66 Acad. Med. 682; T.D. Stratton et al., "Effects of an Expanded Medical Curriculum on the
Number of Graduates Practicing in a Rural State" (1991) 66 Acad. Med. 101; J.E. Verby et al.,
"Changing the Medical School Curriculum to Improve Patient Access to Primary Care" (1991)
266 J. Am. Med. Ass'n 110; J.B. Lawley, "The Physicians for Rural Areas Assistance Act"
(1989) 78 J. Med. Assoc. Ga. 689.
49. R.A. Rosenblatt et al., "Which Medical Schools Produce Rural Physicians?" (1992) 268
J. Am. Med. Assoc. 1559 [emphasis added].
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it is debatable whether the program is a success, or not ....
It is a difficult
program to evaluate because its purpose is unclear ....
NHSC physicians
have provided care to those in some of the most deprived parts of the U.S.,
but few have remained beyond their commitment and many report being
dissatisfied from their experience, and potentially less likely to provide
care in deprived areas in the future."'' 0 In contrast, Taylor notes that the
MPC in the U.K. "has produced a fairly even distribution of GPs across
the U.K ..... [t]he policy has worked reasonably well, but additional
efforts to respond to geographical problem areas became necessary since
the MPC does not have the policy scope to compel GPs to particular areas,
only to approve or deny requests of GPs to locate in particular areas."'"
American and British efforts to redress geographic distribution problems operate in radically different contexts. This contaminates any
attempt to compare policies in these two countries. In an environment
with a national health service, tools are available to give life to MPC-type
initiatives. It is difficult to imagine what a comparable structure might
look like in the United States, or which level of government would hold
the relevant policy levers. It is less difficult to imagine such a mechanism
in a Canadian province, or even operating nationally.
Yet, on another front, we may be seeing convergence of the U.S. and
U.K. systems. As noted above, a key element in the relative success of
geographic distribution policy in the U.K. for GPs has been the method
of payment. When physicians receive significant components of their
income on the basis of the number of patients they enrol in their practices,
there is a clear and unmistakable incentive to make oneself available
where there are patients in apparent need of physicians. Meanwhile,
increasing numbers are becoming patients of practices operating within
similarly 'competitive' environments in the U.S., as managed care
structured around capitated payments for enrolled populations takes
hold. In this context, it is interesting to note that Canadian physicians have
thus far successfully resisted any attempts to change the way in which
primary care is organized and financed. In so doing, they are keeping at
bay an apparently effective tool for improving geographic distribution.
While one could reasonably conclude from any U.S ./U.K. comparison
that the U.K. has been relatively more successful in solving geographic
maldistribution problems, the U.S. evaluation evidence provides some
important insights. Most fundamentally, the comparison of NHSC and
non-NHSC physicians practicing in MUAs does indicate that physicians
who choose to practice in underserved areas because they want to, rather

50.
51.

Taylor, supra note 21.
Ibid.
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than because of the availability of financial incentives, seem more likely
to stay committed in the long term. This seems consistent with most of the
Canadian evidence which indicates that those who accept financial
incentives in return for choosing rural or remote practice locations, tend
to stay for relatively short periods of time. Retention is not achieved by
financial incentives alone.
The New Zealand experience can also inform the Canadian debate.
There has been no consistent effort in New Zealand to address geographic
distribution problems; that country has relied largely on 'hope and
prayer' (laissez-faire) approaches which have failed to redress imbalances.52 For example, between 1981 and 1987, despite large increases in
physician supply and medical care utilization, increases in the initially
more liberally-supplied parts of Auckland outstripped those in the less
well-supplied parts of the city. To the extent that underserved areas had
attracted primary care practitioners, these were largely foreign medical
graduates. This experience provides yet one more reminder, lest there be
any Canadian back-sliding, that letting 'markets' take care of this
problem will not take care of the problem.
Until recently Australia lacked any policies whose primary intent was
to address geographic maldistribution of physicians, although this was
not for lack of a problem. 3 Four mechanisms have recently been
introduced, or are under active discussion. 4 A "GP Rural Incentive
Scheme" provides financial incentives to attract GPs to more remote
locations. The incentives are modest in scope, covering relocation costs,
and support for locums to make it possible for physicians to take
advantage of continuing education opportunities. The size of the incentives is related to the remoteness of the location. A second initiative
currently underway involves the establishment of eight small rural health
units, with two slated for opening in 1997 and the other six to follow
shortly. The units will provide support staff and facilities for physicians
willing to locate in these areas. The plan is to second senior specialists to
the units on a rotating basis, and to rotate medical students, interns and
residents through the units as well. These units are being established by
university medical schools. Additionally, the Commonwealth is provid-

52. Although a short-lived GP contract scheme introduced in 1990 appears to have achieved
some success in reducing access barriers in areas of relatively greater need for services; D.P.
Matheson & R.S. Hoskins, "The general practice contract scheme: was it targeted?" (1992)
105(127) N.Z. Med. J. 35.
53. Personal communication with Dr. R. Boyce (Research Fellow, Graduate School of
Management, The University of Queensland, Australia) (May 1997).
54. Personal communication with J. Richardson (National Centre for Health Program
Evaluation, Melbourne, Australia) (October 1996).
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ing some funding to selected rural hospitals to assist them with efforts to
attract senior specialists for one year 'sabbatical' periods. The hospitals
make fellowships available to these specialists.
Given its history of reliance upon laissez-faire and funding/payment
approaches, it is interesting that Australia was (as of October 1996) about
to introduce a national billing numbers scheme. The number of Commonwealth Medicare numbers will be limited. Existing physicians will
be 'grandfathered,' but the current cohort of interns and residents will be
required to apply for a number. Numbers will only be provided to GPs
who have completed the Royal Australian College of General Practitioner fellowship exams. Without a number, neither the physician, nor the
physician's patients, will be able to seek reimbursement from Medicare.
The College restricts the number of places in each year to about 400; the
implication is that as many as 800 general practitioners may be ineligible
for private practice each year under the new rules. As a result, it is
expected that such physicians will be forced to seek hospital positions
and, since relatively few are available in urban areas, some physicians are
expected to move into rural areas .At present the plan does not involve
geographic restrictions, per se, although the Commonwealth Minister
recently announced a program whereby new medical graduates can be
granted temporary provider numbers if they are prepared to undertake
locum work in rural areas. 5
Interestingly, while individual states in Australia have the power to
register physicians and so could, in principle, restrict access to urban
areas or otherwise direct location decisions through legislation, the
Australian system embodies inter-state portability. This means that any
physician currently practising in any state, has the right to practice
anywhere in any other state. If Queensland, for example, were to invoke
a policy of excluding its new registrants from setting up practice in
Brisbane, this would not stop already registered New South Wales
physicians from moving north to, and setting up practices in, Brisbane.
Not surprisingly, states have not implemented such policies.
On the education front, at least one Australian medical school has
recently responded to the general consensus that continuing to train
physicians in large urban tertiary settings does little to increase the
likelihood that graduates will be enticed by rural practice opportunities .
It opened a rural 'branch plant.' The University of Queensland, based in
Brisbane, has established an affiliated North Queensland clinical school,
55. Ibid.
56. See, e.g., M. Kamien & I.H. Buttfield, "Some solutions to the shortage of general
practitioners in rural Australia: Part 2. Undergraduate education"( 1990) 153 Med. J. Aust. 107.
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based in Townsville, which will develop curricula and clinical exposures
geared to rural area needs and practice conditions. Students from the
Brisbane school have been "rostered" to the northern school since 1993.57
58
An evaluation of the effects of this initiative is currently underway.
What can we learn from this brief and selective international overview? Perhaps the most obvious 'lessons' come from the U.K./U.S.
comparison. The U.K. has clearly been more successful in reducing
geographic disparity than has the U.S. This relative success would seem
to be tied to a number of key characteristics of the U.K. approach: method
of payment and organization of physicians, and an administrative policy
that is rather more 'directive' than anything one finds in the U.S. at
present. With respect to the former, the fact that GPs (a) receive significant components of their incomes through mechanisms tied to patient
roster size and (b) must receive approval of requests to set up practices in
particular locations, would seem to have played a significant role in the
fact that the U.K. does not currently experience serious geographic
distribution problems for GPs. As for specialists, a significant component
of their incomes is derived through salaried posts. These tend to be more
readily available where there are greater needs. Thus specialist availability in the U.K. seems more tightly linked to population-based considerations related to needs for care than is the case in the U.S. The historical
pattern in the U.S. has been that both GPs and specialists physicians can
attempt to set up or join practices wherever they wish. Such choices have
at times been influenced by the availability of incentives through programs such as the National Health Service Corps. It is also revealing that
Australia is now in the process of implementing a national billing
numbers policy, presumably because other approaches have failed to
rectify the maldistribution situation in that country.
Another important 'lesson' for Canadian policy-makers is that a key
characteristic of the U.K. approaches (and the recent Australian billing
numbers initiative) is that they have been national initiatives employed
in an environment where the option for U.K. physicians to move to other
countries to practice has not been all that attractive. The implication
would seem to be that provincial go-it-alone initiatives, even regulatory/
administrative strategies, may fail so long as not all provinces are 'on
board;' even then, physicians may choose the U.S. as an alternative place
to practice medicine, although recent reforms in that country may make
migration south less attractive for Canadian physicians.

57. P.R. Mudge, "A clinical school for north Queensland" (1993) 159 Med. J. Aust. 501.
58. Personal communication with Dr. Peter Mudge (Clinical Dean, North Queensland
Clinical School, The University of Queensland) (May 1997).
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In comparison with these four OECD countries, Canadian provinces
appear to have employed a remarkably rich and inventive collection of
approaches to the problem. While they have been largely dominated by
traditional financial incentives tied to reimbursement through fees-forservice, the recent use of educational approaches appears to offer some
promise, in light of the research on what factors most influence physicians' location decisions. It seems apparent that laissez-faire methods do
not solve distribution problems, even in the long term. Considering what
is known about choice of location, the reliance of provincial governments
upon financial incentives that subsidize fees-for-service has had rather
predictable effects. There is no experience from these other jurisdictions
with disincentive schemes such as differential fees. With the possible
exception of the Qu6bec experience, the evidence from Canadian provinces suggests that these, too, are unlikely to be particularly effective
unless they are unreasonably punitive.
The Yukon, the Northwest Territories, some provinces and the U.S.
employ at least two other options for addressing problems with geographic distribution. The territories have implemented a system that
makes ample use of non-physician practitioners, such as extended duty
nurses and nurse practitioners. In some situations the Territories, along
with provinces such as Newfoundland, have developed a variety of
salaried and contract arrangements with physicians prepared to locate in,
or service, rural or remote regions. The U.S. has been employing nonphysician providers (physician assistants, nurse practitioners, midwives,
nurse-anaesthetists) for at least 25 years, and the increasing adoption of
such practitioners by HMOs as well as in the Medically Underserviced
Areas may indicate their broader potential in Canada. Alberta and
Ontario have recently moved to introduce nurse practitioners, and midwifery has arrived or is coming in Ontario, B.C., Manitoba and Qu6bec.
By and large, however, substitution appears to remain a strategy of last
resort for provincial governments, in large part, one has to presume,
because of continued resistance from the medical profession.
III. Recent Legal Challenges to Physician Geographic
DistributionPolicies
1. British Columbia

Physician supply management policies with geographical distribution
objectives have been or are currently under challenge in the courts of two
Canadian provinces. In British Columbia, the Medical Services Commission (composed of representatives from the B.C. Medical Association,
the provincial Ministry of Health, and the public) adopted its "Permanent
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Physician Supply Measures" (PSM) in October 1996. These measures
consisted of regulatory/administrative financial incentives to encourage
physicians to locate in relatively less well-supplied regions of the
province. The major incentive within the PSM was a graduated set of
differential fees, prorated on a regional and specialty-specific basis.5 9
The PSM were rooted in a Physician Supply Plan which determined, on
a semi-annual basis, whether each region was "under, adequately, or
oversupplied with physicians in each specialty."6° Physicians who set up
new practices in specialty/region combinations which were considered
over-supplied would receive only 50% of the usual negotiated fees; those
in adequately served areas would receive 75%. Practices in underserviced or isolated regions (which were few and declining) 6' were
eligible for at least 100% and up to 120% of negotiated fees, depending
on points assigned to the region through the Northern and Isolation
Allowance (NIA) program.
An important feature of the PSM was that new physicians would
accumulate points in proportion to their fee-for-service billings (20
points per year for a full-time-equivalent practice) and once a physician
had accumulated 100 points, (s)he would no longer be subjected to the fee
proration, regardless of where, or in what specialty, (s)he chose to
practice. Physicians already in practice in 1994,62 as well as U.B.C.
medical students and interns and residents who were in training (or
accepted into training) as of June 30, 1995, were exempted from the
provisions of the Plan. Also, physicians taking up locum tenens arrangements with "grandfathered" physicians were able to amass the 20 points
per year, while practising in non-prorated regions.
In September 1996, adjustments were made to the PSM which had the
effect of requiring any physician wishing to move to a NIA-eligible
community first to receive "written confirmation of community support"
in order to gain a 100% billing number and eligibility for the NIA bonus.
"Community support" was defined as either the existence of a hospital
physician workforce plan, which would presumably indicate whether the
additional physician was needed, or "[s]upport of senior local govern-

59. B.C. Medical Association, British Columbia PhysicianSupply Plan (Victoria: Medical
Services Commission of British Columbia, 1996).
60. See B.C. Medical Services Commission, Minute 96-0015 (Victoria: Medical Services
Commission of British Columbia, 1996) at 10.
61. By 1996, there were no regions in the province in which a new physician not trained in
B.C. and wishing to undertake general or family practice, would have been eligible for 100%
fees.
62. At which point the predecessor "Interim Physician Supply Measures" took effect.
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ment official [sic] and local physicians.' 63 This seemed curious at the
time, since the NIA program is intended to attract physicians to relatively
underserved areas, whereas these adjustments appeared to undermine
that process. If a community is "underserved," on what grounds might
such a community not support a new physician? It appeared to be a thinly
veiled attempt to permit physicians already in those areas to balance their
needs for necessary support and relief, against their "need" for NIApoints-eligibility .4

In August 1995, an action was brought against the B.C. Medical
Services Commission and the Attorney General's Office of B.C. by a
young female physician (Deborah Waldman) and two others who had
been affected by the policy. The Professional Association of Residents B.C. (PAR-BC) intervened on behalf of the petitioners, while the B.C.
Medical Association intervened in support of the respondents.
The petitioners sought judicial review of the PSM and future scheduled modifications. They alleged that:
1. The PSM exceeded the jurisdiction of the Medical Services
65
Commission under B.C.'s Medicare ProtectionAct;
2. The PSM violated certain conditions of the Canada Health
Act, 6 6 specifically the requirement that any provincial medical
insurance program must "provide for reasonable compensation for
all insured health services rendered by medical practitioners."
3. The PSM infringed their rights as guaranteed under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and more specifically the
rights described in s. 6 (mobility rights); s. 7 (rights to life, liberty
and security of the person); and s. 15 (equality rights).
4. Any such infringements were not "reasonable limits prescribed
by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society," as required under s. I of the Charter;
The case of Waldman v. British Columbia (Medical Services Commission)67 was heard in 1996, and a decision was filed in the Supreme Court
of B.C. on June 30, 1997. This decision may have important conse-

63. See British Columbia, British Columbia Physician Supply Plan (31 October 1996)
(Unpublished, appears as Exhibit "R" of Affidavit of Dr. Lorne Verhulst in Supreme Court of
B.C. (Waldman v. British Columbia (MedicalServices Commission) (1997), 150 D.L.R. (4th)
405) [hereinafter Waldman]), Appendix A at 5 [emphasis added].
64. R. Hanvelt & D.Schneider, Comment on the Implementation of the British Columbia
Permanent Physician Supply Measures (December 1996) [unpublished].
65. S.B.C. 1992, c. 76; now R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 286.
66. R.S.C. 1985,c.c-6.
67. Supra note 63.
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quences for the future range of Canadian provincial policy options in this
arena, and possibly for the policy currently under legal challenge in New
Brunswick.
In her decision, Madame Justice Levine first considered whether the
PSM exceeded the administrative jurisdiction provided to the Medical
Services Commission (MSC) through the province's Medicare Protection Act.6" The petitioners argued that the central role played by the B.C.
Medical Association in the development of the PSM revealed that the true
intent of the PSM was to protect the incomes of already-practising
physicians in the province. If such had been found to be the case, this
would have constituted an improper purpose beyond the powers of the
MSC under the Act. The respondents countered that the intent of the PSM
was clearly set out in the preamble to Commission Minute 96-0015, viz
"to ensure more equitable access to medical services and more equitable
distribution of physician resources based on population needs and to
assist in the better management of the provincial health care budget."69

The respondents argued that this purpose was clearly within the powers
granted to the Commission through the Act. The Court agreed with the
respondents' characterization of the intent of the PSM, and affirmed that
their purpose did not fall outside the ambit of the Act. Briefly, the
measures were found not to prevent the petitioners from practising
medicine in the province (which would, the petitioners argued, have
exceeded the powers granted under the Act). Furthermore, the establishment of different categories of practitioners70 for the purposes of creating
different rates of remuneration was found to be within the authority given
to the Commission under the Act.
While Levine J. determined that the PSM discriminate in an administrative sense "between resident and non-resident physicians,"'" she
concluded that the Medicare Protection Act 72 provides the necessary
authority to do so. 73 But it did not provide, in her view, the explicit
authority to discriminate in this manner retroactively. The necessary
authority to discriminate is embodied in s. 4(1)(r.1) of the Act, which was
added to the MedicareProtectionAct through an amendment passed into
68. Supra note 65.
69. As cited in Waldman, supra note 63 at 437.
70. There were 13 categories set out in Minute 96-0015, supra note 60. For example, any
physician active in B.C. as of February 1994 fell into a "grandfathered" category 3.10; those
"new billers" who chose to practice in areas designated as "oversupplied," category 3.3, were
to be granted 50% billing numbers; and various other categories provided for exemptions to
50% and 75% billing number designations.
71. Waldman, supra note 63 at 446 & 448.
72. R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 286.
73. Waldman, supra note 63 at 450.
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law on July 14, 1995."4 Since the section contains nothing explicit about
retroactivity, and since the petitioners had all applied for, and been
denied, 100% billing numbers prior to that date, Levine J. concluded that
the statute did not provide the authority for the Commission to establish
different categories of petitioners with "retroactive effect. 7 5 This was
sufficient to render the PSM "invalid," both with respect to the applications of the three petitioners specifically, and with respect to any practitioners who had been affected by what were, in effect, retroactive
decisions of this nature.
Levine J.'s decision could have ended there, as this was sufficient to
dispose of the case before her. However, in light of the fact that both
parties had asked her to consider the full range of issues "in the expectation that my decision may be reviewed on appeal and that the court of
appeal may disagree with my decision thus far,"76 she provided a

comprehensive analysis and series of obiter remarks on matters arising
from challenges based on the Canada Health Act and the Canadian
CharterofRights and Freedoms.77 We do not intend to precis the entire
judgment. Rather, we focus primarily on the other components of the
petitioners' claims that were supported in the judgment. It is these that
hold the key to future policy options, assuming they survive any appeal
process.
The petitioners claimed that the PSM violated s. 12(1)(c) of the
CanadaHealth Act, specifically the requirement that the Medical Services Plan "provide for reasonable compensation for all insured health
services rendered by medical practitioners." The issues here were
(a) whether 50% fees could be considered "reasonable compensation;"
and (b) whether the PSM violated the Act if the petitioners were not, in
fact, restricted to situations involving 50% fees 7. 8 On the former matter,
Levine J. used evidence provided by a private accounting firm, which
indicated that standard practice overhead costs ranged from 42-44% of
gross, to conclude that 50% (gross) fees could not in any way be

74. Health Statutes Amendment Act, 1995, S.B.C. 1995, c. 52.
75. Waldman, supra note 63 at 456. The key here was that other parts of the Act were explicit
about retroactivity. For example, s. 21(5) states that "The Commission may act retroactively
under this section to...." Since the power to discriminate was embodied in s. 4(l)(r.l), and
since that section was not explicit about retroactivity, Levine J concluded that retroactivity was
not intended, or rather that this section could not be construed as providing the authority to the
Commission to act retroactively in this respect.
76. Ibid. at 458.
77. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. II.
78. Indeed, at the time, none of the petitioners was actually working for 50% fees. One had
a 100% fee hospital post; the other two were in locum tenens situations in urban centres.
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considered "reasonable compensation." 7 9 She also found that the Master
and Working Agreements between the BCMA and the MSC violated
s.12(2) of the CanadaHealth Act.8" On the latter issue, she regarded the
respondents' claim that the intent is to provide reasonable compensation
for all medically necessary services, but not necessarily for all medical
practitioners as "strain[ing] the purpose and the words of the Act beyond
any sensible meaning."" Because s. 4(2) of the MedicareProtectionAct
requires that the Commission's actions be governed by the criteria set out
in the Canada Health Act, she concluded that the Commission had
exceeded its jurisdiction by failing to provide reasonable compensation
under the Plan. 2
With respect to the Charterchallenges, the petitioners claimed that the
PSM violated their rights under ss. 6, 7 and 15 of the Charter.Section
6(2)(b) of the Charter guarantees that "[e]very citizen of Canada and
every person who has the status of a permanent resident of Canada has the
right to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province." Levine J.
determined that the PSM violated this section insofar as "restrictions to
earning their livelihood imposed on physicians coming into the province
from other provinces ...primafacie violate their rights under section
6(2)(b)." 3 In particular, the PSM provided explicit exemptions to "new
billers" trained or in training in B.C. at a specified point in time during
1995, thereby disadvantaging "new billers" from outside B.C. relative to
"new billers" in B.C. 84
The exemptions provided by the MSC's permanent measures applied
to residents in training in B.C. at a particular point in time, or individuals
who were about to enter medical school in the province as of a particular
point in time. Eventually there would no longer be anyone left in those

79. It is interesting that elsewhere in her judgment, Levine J. notes that one of the petitioners
(Waldman) was in a locum situation where she was receiving 60% of gross fees. If overhead
costs are indeed 42-44%, it is difficult to understand why a practitioner would hire a locum
tenens under a 60% arrangement, since simple arithmetic would suggest that the practitioner
who owns the practice would be losing money in such circumstances. There is considerable
dispute among 'students' of physician overhead costs, about what constitutes reasonable and
necessary practice overhead. It is quite possible that 42-44% overstates true overhead, perhaps
by a substantial amount. Nevertheless, it still seems defensible to these observers to conclude
that 50% fees are not "reasonable compensation."
80. The s. 12(2) violations related to such matters as the absence of a mechanism for binding
arbitration, and the fact that the section requires a mechanism for "settlement of disputes
through conciliation or binding arbitration by a panel....", whereas in the current B.C.
agreements, a single arbitrator is specified.
81. Waldman, supra note 63 at 467.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid. at 470.
84. Ibid.at421.
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exemption categories, which left open the question of whether, at that
point, the PSM would still violate s. 6(2)(b) of the Charter.Levine J.
concluded that they would still do so, because new non-B.C. physicians
would still not have the same opportunities to gain a livelihood as at least
some B.C. physicians.
Levine J.'s reasoning appears to get a bit tangled through reference to
the fact that a majority of "new billers" would be from outside B.C." This
seems to imply that had B.C. (like Ontario) been a net exporter of "new
billers," the PSM would not violate s. 6(2)(b) after the grandfathering of
B.C.-trained "new billers" had expired. This seems inconsistent with the
idea that the key matter to be considered is not whether there is equal
treatment of resident and non-resident "new billers" (which there would
be), but rather whether there is equal treatment of all residents and nonresidents (which there would not be, since all non-new-biller residents are
grandfathered).
The problem becomes even more complicated, since s. 6(2)(b) of the
Charter can be overridden under s. 6(3)(a) by laws of the province, so
long as such laws do not "discriminate among persons primarily on the
basis of province of present or previous residence." In concluding that the
permanent PSM violate s. 6(3)(a), Levine J. noted that the measures "will
nevertheless continue to distinguish principally on the basis of province
of present or previous residence,' 8 6 because most new billers wishing to
set up practice in B.C. will be non-residents of B.C. Extending this logic,
one might conclude that the constitutionality of a policy such as the PSM
depends on whether physicians from outside a province attempt to set up
practice in the province. This could vary from province to province, and
from year to year, and seems a rather fragile basis for determining that this
section of the Charteris violated by such a policy. In particular, were this
policy to have been enacted in Ontario or Qu6bec, where the majority of
"new billers" would presumably be Ontario or Qu6bec residents, on this
interpretation s. 6(3)(a) would not be violated. Surely this is not what was
intended. Either the Charters. 6 requires that residents and non-residents
be treated equally, or it does not. If it does, then why would it matter
whether there was 1, or a majority of, new billers coming from outside a
given province?
Levine J. found that the PSM did not violate the petitioners' rights
under s. 7 of the Charter(life, liberty and security of the person). Briefly
stated, Levine J. considered herself bound by jurisprudence subsequent

85.
86.

Ibid.at 471.
Ibid. at 473.
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8
87
and contrary to the 1980's B.C. judgments in the Mia and Wilson 1
cases. In particular, the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in the
"Soliciting Reference '"89 led Levine J. to conclude that "section 7 does not
protect the right of a person to practise a profession." 90 Once that
conclusion was reached, it became unnecessary to further consider s. 7,
since the petitioners' claims of violation of "liberty" pertained only to the
alleged right to practice their profession.
The claims with respect to s. 15 (equality rights) were that the PSM
discriminated on the basis of age and province of previous residence (in
the case of all petitioners), and sex and religion in the case of Waldman.
Levine J. found against the petitioners on the age, sex and religion
grounds, but in their favour on grounds of previous residence,9' which
she concluded was "an analogous ground" under s.15.9 2
The remainder of the judgment dealt with whether the violations of
ss.6 and 15 could be construed as "reasonable limits demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society" under s. 1 of the Charter.The
key considerations in attempting to satisfy this test are whether the limits
were imposed in the pursuit of objectives of "sufficient importance"
bearing on a "pressing and substantial concern," and whether the means
chosen (in this case the PSM) were "proportional and appropriate to the
ends." 93 Levine J. found that the objectives (maintaining or improving the

87. Mia v. British Columbia (Medical Services Commission) (1985), 17 D.L.R. (4th) 385
(B.C.S.C.).
88. Wilson v. British Columbia (Medical Services Commission) (1988) 53 D.L.R. (4th) 171
(B.C.C.A.).
89. Reference re: ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123.
90. Waldman, supra note 63 at 481.
91. Ibid. at 490.
92. Ibid. at 493. Again this conclusion, like that on s. 6(3)(a), appears to be based largely on
the fact of the distribution of source of new physicians in B.C. Had B.C. been a province that
imported no new physicians from other provinces or countries, it seems possible, on the
reasoning here, that Levine J. would have found no violation of s. 15. She states, at 494: "In
this case, the Commission clearly had in mind the effect of the measures on out-of-province
physicians and enacted the measures with the intention of limiting their entry into the medical
care system for B.C." But what if a province has no medical school, in which caseany new biller
would be from out of province if one equates location of training with location of residence?
And what of provinces most of whose new physicians are trained 'at home'? The implication
seems to be, again, that an identical policy, enacted in different provinces, could be evaluated
differently with respect to s. 15. Our interpretation is that the s. 6 and 15 violations are
synonymous, in the sense that if Levine J. had found in favour of the respondents on s. 6, she
would have similarly found in favour on s. 15, and vice versa. The grounds on which the PSM
were found to violate each section are likely, in the end, to be indistinguishable to most
observers outside the legal profession, despite the fact that in the former case the issue was
"mobility" and in the latter it was "equality." In both cases, it came down to whether all
physicians had 'equal mobility.'
93. This test was originally formulated in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
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quality of health care provided to the residents of B.C., and managing or
94
controlling health care sector costs) were "pressing and substantial.
However, she was persuaded by the analysis of economist Robin Hanvelt,
in which he argued that the PSM were unlikely to reduce supply, improve
geographic distribution, or help control health care costs. 95 Particularly
significant were the facts that most physicians confronted with the PSM
choice were opting for locums, and that there were no regions where new
general practitioners could be granted 100% billing numbers. This
seemed rather likely to vitiate any effects of the PSM on geographic
distribution, or on overall costs. Also troublesome was the apparent
contradiction between identifying regions with established needs, and
entitling existing physicians in those regions to determine whether a new
physician would be accepted.96 Indeed, Levine J. was rather explicit
about this: "The measures are in fact contradictory to the stated objective." 97 In addition, she determined that the infringement of the petitioners' mobility and equality rights did not meet the minimal impairment
standard under s. 1. Thus, the PSM failed the proportionality branch of the
"Oakes test."
In summary,Levine J. found that the PSM exceeded the jurisdiction of
the MSC under the Medicare ProtectionAct, went beyond the province's
authority because the measures conflicted with the federal Canada
Health Act, and also violated petitioners' rights under ss. 6 and 15 of the
Charterin ways that were not justifiable under s. 1 of the Charter.
2. New Brunswick
The other recent challenge to a provincial regime was brought against
New Brunswick's "Physician Resource Management Plan" (the Plan).
The Plan was established in 1992, and one of its key objectives was to
attempt to encourage physicians establishing new practices in the province to do so in regions with relatively greater needs for physicians. The
Plan established target population: physician ratios for each specialty
(and for general practitioners) for the year 2000-2001, and assigned to
regional hospital corporations the responsibility of ensuring that new
physicians were permitted to establish practices only if doing so would

94. Waldman, supra note 63 at 497.
95. R. Hanvelt, "A Review of the British Columbia Medical Services Commission's
Permanent Physician Supply Measures," expert report prepared for the petitioners in Waldman.
96. R. Hanvelt and D. Schneider, 1996.
97. Waldman, supra note 63 at 501.

352

The Dalhousie Law Journal

keep the region within the full-time-equivalent interim supply target for
the year, region, and specialty in question. 98
Unlike the situation in British Columbia, where physicians could
establish practices wherever they wished if they were prepared to work
for 50% or 75% fees, New Brunswick physicians who are not granted
privileges by the regional hospital corporations cannot establish practices
(or rather can establish practices only if they are prepared to receive 0%
fees from the provincial medical plan and practice without hospital
privileges). 99 Furthermore, any corporation that permits the addition of
physicians not approved by the Department of Health faces quite punitive
disincentives: a corporation that grants unauthorized privileges to a
physician, where doing so has the effect of taking the region over target
for the specialty, is responsible for bearing the cost of that physician's feefor-service billings to the Medicare Branch. 100
The action in this case was brought by four physicians and the
Professional Association of Residents and Interns - Maritime Provinces.
The petitioners claim that the restriction of billing numbers, the placement of regional and specialty quotas on full-time-equivalent physicians,
combined with restrictions on the privileges hospital corporations may
grant, and the refusal to reimburse for services delivered by a physician
without a billing number, violate the Charter'sfreedom of association
(s.2), the right to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in the province of
New Brunswick (s. 6), rights to liberty and security of person (s. 7), and
sex equality (s. 15). The equality argument is based on the fact that the
current supply of physicians in urban centres is male-dominated, and the
Plan has the effect (if not the intent) of perpetuating that situation just as
the supply of new physicians entering practice has become more 'genderbalanced.'
While our interpretation of the litigation is that it is firmly rooted in the
above alleged Charterviolations, the plaintiffs are also claiming that the
Plan violates the "comprehensiveness" and "accessibility" provisions of
the Canada Health Act. 1 1 This case is scheduled to be before the courts
some time in 1998. Various experts, the plaintiffs, and Department of
Health officials have been examined during the past two years. 102
98. New Brunswick, Physician Resource Management: A Plan for New Brunswick
(Fredericton: Department of Health and Community Services, 1992).
99. The patient who received services from such a physician would also not be eligible for
reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses.
100. New Brunswick, Policy and Procedures: Physician Resource Management, rev. ed.
(Fredericton: Department of Health and Community Services, 1994).
101. R.S.C. 1985,c.c-6.
102. One of us (M.L.B.) served as a consultant to the New Brunswick Department of Health
in this respect.
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IV. Implications and Options
These B.C. and New Brunswick cases are interesting in a number of
respects. The Waldman judgment would appear to pose significant
challenges for the respondents in the current New Brunswick action. The
policies are not identical, but there would appear to be some significant
similarities. If the New Brunswick courts also find in favour of the
petitioners, it is likely to send a clear signal about the range of potential
policy interventions that will be tolerated by Canadian courts. This in turn
will limit the potential of Canadian policy makers to take advantage of
international experience.
We offer some brief thoughts here on the applicability of the approach
taken in Waldman to the New Brunswick action. 03 With respect to the
CanadaHealth Act, there would seem to be a key difference in the two
situations. Under the B.C. PSM, physicians were faced with being
reimbursed at 50% fees if they chose to practice in over-supplied areas.
In such a situation, they would be providing "medically necessary"
services as defined under that Act, but would not be receiving reasonable
compensation. Under the New Brunswick policy, positions are simply
not available in certain regions and specialties, so arguably no "medically
necessary" services would be provided by physicians who choose not to
practice in regions with available positions. 04 Under such circumstances, it may be that the court will determine that the issue of "reasonable compensation" simply does not arise, particularly if there are other
regions in which the practitioners in question could receive hospital, and
therefore billing, privileges.'0 5
The Charterissues seem more problematic, although again there are
some key, perhaps determinative, differences between the two policies.
The B.C. PSM created a clear distinction between new billers and
already-practising physicians. The latter were free to move without
restriction within the province for the purposes of practising medicine.

103. Bearing in mind that neither of the authors claims any legal expertise, and that if past
experience is any guide, one would not wish to bet too heavily on the judgment in Waldinan
guiding the judgment in the New Brunswick case.
104. Presumably a physician could choose to practise outside the provincial plan and so
without access to hospital services. In such a case patients would presumably offer reasonable
compensation, or else the services would likely not be provided. But see note 105.
105. One might speculate that the petitioners will argue that what they are being offered in
those situations is 0% fees (because they would not be eligible for compensation from the New
Brunswick medical care plan, and they would be unlikely to find patients willing to pay out of
pocket, particularly in light of the fact that these will be regions which are already deemed
oversupplied). However, if no services are being, or are likely to be, provided by new billers
in the regions in question, then it seems unlikely that a "reasonable compensation" argument
under the Canada Health Act could be sustained.
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The New Brunswick Plan, in contrast, applies restrictions equally to all
physicians, in the sense that established physicians practising in one
region of New Brunswick are not free to take up and re-establish their
practice in other areas, unless those areas are under their physician:
population target ratios for the specialty in question at the time of
application. In this important sense, the Plan makes no distinction by
province of residence in the application of the policies and procedures.
Even under the New Brunswick Plan the playing field is not level,
however, because older physicians will have had prior access to the more
desirable practice locations. While all new entrants, in any field, face
restricted opportunities relative to those with already established jobs or
practices, the petitioners will undoubtedly argue that they should be
afforded equal opportunity to provide services wherever they feel they
can establish a successful practice, because they are independent practitioners and not employees of the state.
With respect to mobility rights, New Brunswick has no medical
school; all new entrants will be non-residents as defined by Madame
Justice Levine. Although all physicians face a restricted range of potential practice settings under the Plan, those already in practice in New
Brunswick will have included in their restricted range the locations in
which they already practice (many of which may not be available to the
new entrants). Therefore, new entrants will experience more restricted
choices than resident physicians. In light of the Waldman judgment, it
seems possible that the New Brunswick court could find that the Plan
violates mobility rights of new entrants, even though all physicians,
residents and non-residents alike, are faced with the same rules. Or, put
another way, were Levine J. to be presiding over the New Brunswick
case, we do not believe that she would rule differently on s. 6 in New
Brunswick than she did in B.C. But of course the judge, the petitioners,
the respondents, and the details, will all be different, and there seems little
to be gained from this sort of speculation.
As for equality rights guaranteed under s. 15, the key here will be the
specific bases on which the petitioners allege discrimination. To the best
of our knowledge, the only specified ground at this time is "sex," the
argument being that new entrants are, relative to established practitioners, disproportionately female, and so new female entrants are being
denied equal access to desirable practice locations. In light of the very
similar circumstances in front of Levine J., it seems unlikely that the Plan
would be found to violate the petitioners' rights on the basis of sex. If the
New Brunswick court is asked to determine whether the Plan discriminates on the "analogous ground" of province of residence, the situation
will be one in which all new billers will, by definition, be coming from
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outside New Brunswick and so be deemed non-residents. If the same line
of argument as was used by Levine J. were then to be followed by the New
Brunswick courts, again it seems conceivable that the Plan could be found
to violate the petitioners' rights under s. 15 of the Charter.
It is well beyond the scope of this paper to speculate on the likely
outcome of any attempted s. 1 justification for any alleged Charter
violations. The challenges for the province of New Brunswick, as in B.C.,
will be to demonstrate the importance of the objectives, and then that the
Plan passes the test of proportionality. Key to this would be a demonstration that the Plan (which will have had a number of years to run) is meeting
those objectives. If it is not, then it may well fail to show the requisite
rational connection between the means and the objective. Even if a
rational connection is proved, it will still be up to the province to
demonstrate that other, less intrusive, means of achieving those same
ends could not have been developed.
What does seem beyond debate is that any provincial or territorial
policy that can be seen as restricting any aspect of free choice of practice
location will be subject to challenge until, or unless, the legal landscape
is brought into sharper focus. The recent B.C.judgment begins to provide
some clarity; the New Brunswick case promises to elucidate matters even
further.
This leaves open the issue of what options for improving geographic
distribution might remain. Leaving aside a divergent outcome from the
New Brunswick action, our analysis above suggests that, were B.C. to
wish to take another run at a regulatory/administrative approach, it would
need to satisfy, inter alia, the following conditions:
1. either the policies should not be applied retroactively, or the
Medicare Protection Act would need to be amended to make
explicit the retroactive scope of the intended measures;
2.
unless the gradations are much finer (e.g., 90%, 80%) a
differential fees approach is likely to run afoul of the CanadaHealth
Act (although, interestingly, the 70% fees in Qu6bec have been in
place for years). Depending on the outcome of the New Brunswick
action, it may be more productive to develop another true billing
numbers policy in which billing numbers either are, or are not,
available;
3.
any new initiative must not discriminate against new entrants
from outside the province and must be less overtly protective of
members of the BCMA. The fact that the PSM policy had the effect
(even if Levine J. was satisfied that it was not the primary intent of
the MSC) of protecting the incomes of established physicians at the
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expense of new entrants, left it clearly vulnerable to s. 6 and s.15
challenges.
In the end it may simply not be worth taking this route. Indeed, if the
New Brunswick government also comes out on the losing end of that
action, we would be left in a situation where
1. the courts inside our borders seem disinclined to permit any
regulatory/administrative intervention that has the effect of disadvantaging new entrants on the basis of their province of residence;
2.
evidence from outside our borders suggests that the policies
that have been found to be most effective embody some restrictions
in choice for new entrants, and/or different (non-fee-for-service)
approaches to paying for physician services;
3. evidence from within our borders suggests that policies based
largely on financial incentives tacked onto fee-for-service reimbursement are relatively ineffective (the Qu6bec differential fees
evidence notwithstanding);
4. evidence from provinces such as Alberta suggests that even
complex and comprehensive mixes of policies which attempt to
span the physician life-cycle have, to date, not achieved the results
that their architects might have hoped; 106
5.
most provincial medical associations continue to resist fundamental changes to the way the services of physicians are organized
and reimbursed; and
6.
most physicians resist inroads into their 'scopes of practice'
by fully-qualified alternative personnel.
Decisions such as Waldman would then appear to leave policy-makers
caught firmly between the proverbial rock and hard place. For example,
if the New Brunswick policy is overturned, could one infer that the courts
would also not allow a province to attempt to solve the geographic
distribution problem by doing away with fees-for-service, replacing them
with salaried posts, and making those posts available only where there are
established needs? In such a situation, one could argue that new entrants
(all non-residents) would be disadvantaged relative to physicians already
in place unless one adopted a "zero base" approach in which everyone,
new and experienced physicians alike, had to apply for the new positions.
Did the Charter intend to imply that one must disrupt long-established

106. For a description of the policy scope across the life-cycle, see G.L. Stoddart & M.L.
Barer, "Toward integrated medical resource policies for Canada: 3. Analytic framework for
policy development" (1992) 146 Can. Med. Assoc. J. 1173; the comprehensive Alberta
approach is described in C.A. MacDonald and Associates, "Evaluation of the Rural Physician
Action Plan" (Prepared for Alberta Health, February 1996) [unpublished].
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professional practices and financial, personal, and patient commitments
already in place, in order to be found not in violation of inter-provincial
mobility rights? Any other approach to this problem necessarily involves
some measure of grandfathering, and in many provinces the
"grandfathered" physicians will be residents and the new entrants will be
disproportionately non-residents. "I

The two policies (B.C. and New Brunswick) differentially affect new
physicians attempting to establish practices, although in so doing, they do
not create situations much different than those that are faced by most new
job-market entrants in most other fields of endeavour. If both ultimately
fail to pass judicial scrutiny, the big 'losers' may be the "grandfathered"
members of the profession. If policy levers such as differential fees and
billing number restrictions are found to violate Charterrights, and cannot
be saved under s.1, provincial departments of health are likely to move
more forcefully and swiftly toward broader, more sweeping, organizational and financial reform. Initiatives under such circumstances might
include the revamping of primary care organization and payment, more
liberal regulations governing the scopes of practice of non-physician
providers such as nurse practitioners, and even the embodiment of
budgets for medical care within regional funding structures in an effort
to have funding for medical care follow patients rather than providers.
Some observers (ourselves included) would suggest that such reforms are
long overdue in any case.' 08 If this comes to pass, then some of the
international approaches reviewed earlier in this paper, as well as others,
may yet offer important insights.
If the New Brunswick action is unsuccessful and that province's Plan
stands, we would expect to see more provinces (including British Colum-

107. Indeed, physicians with already-established practices would find themselves at a clear
advantage relative to new entrants even under a scheme that adopted the capitation-based
payment aspect of the U.K. approach to primary care funding. The difference, in the eyes of
the courts, would presumably be that new entrants are not barred from attempting to establish
practices. But the effects, on the ground, might be not that much different, and so one could even
speculate, hard as it may be to believe, that the effects in the courts might also not be that much
different!
108. A detailed description of what these options entail is well beyond the scope or intent of
the present paper. Discussion of some of these ideas can be found in the recent report of the
National Forum on Health (National Forum on Health, CanadaHealthAction: Building on the
Legacy, vols I & II (Ottawa: National Forum on Health, 1997)), and one possible model for
primary care reform is described in Federal/Provincial/Territorial Advisory Committee on
Health Services, The Victoria Report on PhysicianRemuneration: A model for the reorganization of primary care and the introduction of pouplation-basedfunding: A discussion
document (Victoria: The Committee, 1995).
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bia) attempt to design policies with similar features for improving access
to physician services for rural, remote and other underserved populations,
in part because they would require less immediate and direct conflict with
the established members of the medical profession than would the more
fundamental reforms noted above. Indeed, it would then not be beyond
the realm of possibility that we might see a pan-provincial/territorial
policy, such as that recently established in Australia, emerge from the
chaos. Whether such initiatives would improve access for those populations truly in need and would do so more efficiently and equitably than
the other more fundamental reforms noted above, remains a critical
outstanding question, and one unlikely to be answered any time soon.

